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I.

INTRODUCTION

Therapeutic jurisprudence is a relatively young school of
thought. One of its major attractions to the academic community has
been its claim that society could use the law, both at the legislative and
adjudicatory level, to promote the psychological well-being of those
affected by the law. In this commentary, I want to share a little known
decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico regarding police persecution of political minorities. It is my contention that looking at this
decision through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence, one may discover a serious effort by the court to heal very divisive wounds on the
Puerto Rican political body-an effort which no other branch or
institution was ready, or willing, to undertake.
II. EXPANDING THE USE OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Therapeutic jurisprudence is moving forward into new areas of
academic interest. As David Wexler, one of the founders of the movement, states in the Introduction to this Symposium,1 therapeutic
jurisprudence has moved ahead into the world of practice, and, most
recently, into the appellate level. In order to provide evidence regarding this recent development, Wexler mentions two recent articles in
Court Review, the official journal of the American Judges Association.
Some time ago, I had the opportunity to read a draft version of
one of those articles,2 and found it fascinating. In the article, Professor
Nathalie Des Rosiers, from the University of Western Ontario, dist Noriega v. Governor, 122 P.R. Dec. 650, 1988 WL 580739, 1988 P.R.-Eng. 580, 739
(P.R. Sup. Ct.).
* Professor of Law, University of Puerto Rico School of Law.
1. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 217 (2000).
2. Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of
Courts in Minority/Majority Conflicts, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 54.
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cusses a Canadian Supreme Court case that involved issues regarding
Quebec's drive to secede from Canada.'
As a professor of International Law, I find this decision important and momentous for the future of complex issues regarding selfdetermination. As is often the case, it was a decision involving very
important international law issues, yet decided in a domestic context,
by an appellate court with a responsibility over domestic constitutional
processes. 4 The issue the Canadian Supreme Court faced had enormous divisive potential within the country, something that would have
invited many courts to dodge the issue, avoiding its crispy political
overtones. The least we can say regarding this case is that the
Canadian Supreme Court was ready to draw some preliminary lines as
to a procedural' solution to a highly charged debate.
It may not be the last word on the issue; the political forces will
still have to work it out among themselves. There may not be any way
out of the conundrum, but at least there are now some proposed
guidelines and a minimal attempt to sound rational and to "hear" the
position of the Qufbecois regarding the balance of responsibilities
among the different political branches and levels. The court thought
that it had a constitutional role to play regarding the controversy and
used an approach that it categorized as "therapeutic." 6
III. NORIEGA V. HERNANDEZ COLON: THE PUERTO RICAN CASE
In America, a feeling often prevails that some issues, such as
those regarding self-determination, which, as we have just seen, affects
many foreign countries, even well-developed modern democracies
3. Ref. Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
4. Rosalyn Higgins, recognizing how often domestic courts will, in some legal cultures, feel
some hesitation to decide issues involving international law, has made the following assertion:
Although it is natural that the judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice
will have a great authority, it is also natural in a decentralized, horizontal legal order
that the courts of nation states should also have a role to play in contributing to the
norms of international law.
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT

208 (1994).
Janis and Noyes, authors of a contemporary casebook on International Law, point out the
importance of domestic courts in the following terms:
We begin with municipal courts. The great majority of international law cases that
are settled by formal judicial process are decided by municipal not by international
courts. For most lawyers practicing international law, domestic law courts are the
usual fora foreseen in negotiations and employed in litigation ....
MARK W. JANIS and JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW-CASES AND COMMENTARY
149 (1997).
5. See Des Rosiers, supra note 2, at 54-55.
6. Id.
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close to our borders, such as Canada, are no longer and should never
again be factors in our political reality.
Centripetal political tensions are perceived in the United States
political folklore as "negative," 7 even unthinkable propositions. At the
same time, the possibility of collective violations of what are perceived
as fundamental civil or human rights, such as the right to free speech,
assembly, and citizen involvement in civic political action, are broadly
seen as things of the past, unworthy of a modern state, and something
that will not occur again in a jurisdiction under the American flag.
Many Americans, judges included, tend to believe that what may be
looked at today as normal or prevalent in Africa, Asia, Latin America,
or the Caribbean, will only appear in America in individual cases, generally as something exceptional.' These same people tend to believe
that tolerating the emergence of such centripetal forces within the
confines of the United States constitutional model raises the danger of
dissolving the cohesive element that holds together the fabric of
American constitutional democracy.
Such an ethos has been prevalent for a long time. It is based on
the notion that the United States is different, maybe exceptional.
During the Cold War, political fireworks ignited in the United
Nations General Assembly over the political status question of Puerto
Rico. Communist governments, such as Cuba, denounced political
repression in Puerto Rico. The response of prominent United States
liberal academics, forceful defenders of human rights such as Thomas
M. Franck, a past president of the American Society of International
Law, was to dismiss the whole situation as merely another communist
smokescreen. 9
The book in which Thomas Franck's commentaries were made,
Nation Against Nation, was published in 1985. In 1988, the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico entertained an appeal from a district court deci7. In my opinion, this attitude may respond to both the generalized tendency after the
Peace of Westphalia to support the consolidation of strong centralized states, as well as the particular trauma evoked in the United States by the Civil War. The attitude, however, is not
specifically North American. The international community in general has expressed its
preference regarding fixed states' borders, although important dissident voices are being
expressed. One example of the dissident voice is that of Makau Wa Mutua, author of an article
entitled Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113
(1995).
8. That it has not been so exceptional is a conclusion one could draw from one of the citations used by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Supreme Court in the Noriega case, 122 P.R.
Dec. at 656, 1988 WL 580739 at *1. I am referring in particular to H.M. MITGANG, DANGEROUS DOSSIERS-EXPOSING THE SECRET WAR AGAINST AMERICA'S GREATEST AUTHORS
(1988).
9. THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION-WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N.
DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT 195-204 (1985).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 24:555

sion that found unconstitutional a practice that apparently had been
followed for decades in the shades of the justice system by all government administrations in Puerto Rico. 1" Since the 1930s, the Puerto
Rican police created files and dossiers on all individuals, groups, or
organizations that professed a belief in independence as the final
solution to the question of Puerto Rico's political status.11 Most of
those dossiers had been created based only on the citizens' political or
ideological beliefs.12 In almost all the cases, there was no evidence that
connected those citizens with the commission of, or the attempt to
commit, any criminal acts.'" The lower court found the practice
"illegal and unconstitutional, since it violates the rights to freedom of
speech, association, and privacy and for being an affront to the dignity
of a human being."14
In a second appeal by the government, the court" found that a
few of the groups affected by the practice may have in effect been
involved in clandestine operations that in turn may have justified
police intervention. The court took measures to separate those
instances of genuine police concerns from the rest of the cases.
At the time the district court received this case, there was already
evidence of more than 25,000 dossiers and cards in existence, containing information on more than 135,000 individuals, or 3% of the total
population of the Island. 6 There were, of course, instances of individuals who were not independence supporters who nonetheless had a
dossier opened in their name, but those were clearly the exception. 7
For more than a century, Puerto Rico has been a territory under
United States jurisdiction." When the case was originally presented
10. Noriega, 122 P.R. Dec. at 701, 1998 WL 580739 at *27 (Hernandez- Denton, J.,
concurring).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 693-94 (Negr6n-Garcia, J., concurring). This is a clear example of group
"stigmatizing" or "labeling", a practice whose effects are described by Professor Bruce J. Winick,
Scholar in Residence at the University of Miami School of Law in Coral Gables, Florida. See
Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implicationsfor Mental Health
Law, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
13. Noriega, 122 P.R. Dec. at 700-02, 1998 WL 580739 at *27.
14. Id. at 655. Direct quotations from the Puerto Rico Supreme Court opinions cited
throughout this article are my own translations, since the official translations were not available
at the time this Article was written.
15. See Noriega-Rodriguez v. Hernandez Col6n, 130 P.R. Dec. 919, 1992 WL 755596
(1992) (Negr6n-Garcia, J., opinion).
16. Id. at 945, 1992 WL 755596 at *11.
17. Id.
18. For a brief and sound discussion of Puerto Rico-U.S. relations see JOSE TRIAS MONGE,
PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD (1997).

Hon. Trias

Monge served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico from 1974 to 1985. Id. at
xii. Another interesting account is offered by Hon. Juan R. Torruella, Chief Judge of the United
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in court in 1987, the government of Puerto Rico immediately admitted
that it had been involved in the practice of creating files and dossiers,
that the practice was illegal, and that it would renounce use of the
practice in the future.19 Although at that time the United States had
not yet ratified the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, 2' a document that guaranteed most of the rights admittedly
violated, it had signed the Convention in 1966. Thus, the United
States had the responsibility of acting in good faith regarding its
commitments.
Furthermore, it could be argued that most of the rights violated
were already part of general customary international law, which, as we
know from Paquete Habana, "are part of the law of the land." 21 Those
were obligations that the United States had toward the international
community and, some will argue, toward the individuals themselves.
If a local government (such as the government of the commonwealth)
had been responsible for violating those rights for more than 40 years
(at least since the charter of the United Nations came into place), the
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (Universidad de Puerto Rico ed., 1985).
19. Noriega, 122 P.R. Dec. at 665.
20. The United States finally ratified it in the 1990s. In the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987), Section 702 provides:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages
or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.
Comment b of the Restatement provides the following:
State policy as violation of customa7y law. In general, a state is responsible for acts of
officials or official bodies, national or local, even if the acts were not authorized by or
known to the responsible national authorities, indeed even if expressly forbidden by
law, decree or instruction. The violations of human rights cited in this section, however, are violations of customary international law only if practiced, encouraged, or
condoned by the government of a state as official policy.
In Comment m, which refers to instances of consistent patterns of violations, the Restatement includes the following analysis:
All the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration and protected by the principal
International Covenants are internationally recognized human rights, but some rights
are fundamental and intrinsic to human dignity. Consistent patterns of violation of
such rights as state policy may be deemed "gross" ipso facto. These include, for
example, systematic harassment, invasions of the privacy of the home, arbitrary arrest
and detention.
See also Louis Henkin et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 349-54 (1999).
21. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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United States was responsible internationally for those violations.
There was no credible argument to be made that could provide the
federal government with an escape from its responsibilities.
But there was more involved in the case. No issue has divided
Puerto Ricans more than the issue of self-determination. The independence minority was, and still is, a legitimate alternative in any
decision regarding Puerto Rico's ultimate political status. United
States presidents have, on a number of occasions, articulated that
publicly.22
Yet, supporters of independence were subject to persecution
similar to that suffered by other groups in Eastern European dictatorships-something other Puerto Rican domestic political groups did
not have to endure. Those events involving differentiated repression
had created a serious situation of mistrust within Puerto Rican society." On many occasions, even relatives were used to provide or
collect information regarding their brothers' and sisters' activities.
If legitimate political divisions were not enough, now it was
evident that the Puerto Rican society suffered the objective criminalization of legitimate political activities. Arguments were raised regarding the serious damage done to many of the affected individuals and
families. Due to those dossiers, there was the potential for many
supporters of independence to find themselves jobless and discriminated against."
22. See Statement of Jeffrey L. Farrow, Co-Chair, President's Interagency Group on
Puerto Rico, to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on H.R. 856 and S. 472,
July 15, 1998. As recently as 1998, Jeffrey L. Farrow expressed the following views in his
testimony to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
President Clinton firmly believes that after a century under the U.S. flag, Puerto
Ricans should be enabled to choose among all of the real options: national sovereignty, either independence or in free association with the United States; membership
in the Union of States; and continuing the present arrangement. This is his highest
priority regarding Puerto Rico. He will strongly support nationhood or statehood if
Puerto Ricans vote for either status, and he will continue to work to make the current
arrangement work better for them as long as they do not. Again, he has no preference
among the options, believing the decision should be Puerto Ricans'.
Id.
23. In the 1992 Supreme Court opinion, Justice Hemandez Denton makes the following
description of the police activities:
Police investigators would seat in courses at the University in order to hear the
teachers, participated in students strikes in order to identify leaders and collaborators,
and looked through the windows of the houses of the parents of the participants in
order to find out what they were reading and what television programs they followed.
See Noriega-Rodriguez, 130 P.R. Dec. at 964, 1992 WL 755596 at *24.
24. Again, Judge Hernindez Denton provides a vivid description of the psychological context within which persecution took place. Quoting from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Civil Rights Commission Report, he describes the climate:
Persecution and discrimination became part of our daily diet. Supporters of inde-
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It was obvious that the state was using its resources and organisms to persecute this group. Every individual suspected of favoring
independence was categorized as a potential subversive and subject to
constant surveillance. That is the evidence that the courts had before
them.25
Now came the moment for the supreme court, as well as the
district court, to provide a remedy. All the dossiers involved had been
prepared by police agents in collaboration with informers. The names
of each were part of the dossiers.26 Some of the people who provided
information for the dossiers had not been aware of the ways they
would be used.
At this stage, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico suddenly
realized the many interests affected, and tried to establish a council
under its supervision to take control over the circumstances in which
citizens could gain access to the dossiers. The supreme court, in
rejecting the government proposal, openly characterized the foundations over which Puerto Rican democracy was being played out as
somewhat "paranoiac" as a result of those constitutional violations.
If we revoke the decision and sustain the authority of the Council to put in effect the remedies, we will be further promoting a
state of distrust and suspicion within the 74,000 people directly
affected by the practice and within the rest of the citizens which
believe and support the notion of a democratic government
which must always respect
2 7 and preserve the fundamental rights
which rule our social life.
At this stage, it seems that the supreme court was not ready to
accept a proposition from the government that might give further
ground to increasing distrust on the part of the affected parties. The
supreme court was aware that only the courts were in a position to
provide for a transparent process through which a "healing" effect
could be felt. In addition to Judge Peter Ortiz, who offered the court's
opinion, other judges expressed themselves in even stronger terms.
Judge Negr6n Garcia, for example, characterized the practice as, "a

pendence were close to accept this practice as part of their destiny, as the necessary
and logical conclusion of the ideological position they had taken. It looked as if there
was no social will capable of convincing persecutors that they should leave alone the
persecuted in order for them to live in peace.
Id. at 965, 1992 WL 755596 at *23.
25. Id. See also id. at 21.
26. See id. at 926-28, 1992 WL 755596 at *5-9 (discussing in great detail the issues raised
regarding the identification of the informers).
27. Noriega, 122 P.R. Dec. 650,689, 1988 WL 580739, at *23.
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sad face of our history as a People" and as "a2 chapter in which the
country constitutionally underdeveloped itself' . 1
Judge Negr6n Garcia understood that he needed to go a step further in order to dignify as citizens those who had been persecuted.
For decades, the State, which paradoxically was the one called to
promote and assure a pacific and orderly living had been silently
acting at the margins of the constitution.
The so-called "subversive lists" were a threat to Puerto Rican
democracy. They constituted keys which would provide official
access to subtle, direct or indirect, and indiscriminate repression.
Beyond being a catalogue of documents, in its essence, the lists
and catalogues maintained a degrading and offending stigma,
one which is a transgression against the dignity, privacy, and the
rights to expression and free association of thousand of citizens.
If this decision has any value, it is being able to stop the practice
through which the movement for independence in Puerto Rico
was necessarily associated with acts of violence and criminal
conduct...
This old practice should have never taken root. Although it is
typical of fascism or castrating dictatorships, on occasions it has
appeared in countries with a democratic tradition. Puerto Rico
has not been an exception. It constitutes a spot in our collective
life as a people which will be difficult to erase. In order to
achieve its total extirpation, avoid its repetition and in order for
it not to reappear in future generations, it deserves our most
energetic and unanimous condemnation.2 9
Judge Federico Herndndez Denton made reference to a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Civil Rights Commission Report published
in the 1970s that condemned this practice, but the Government of
Puerto Rico did not pay any attention.30 He concluded:
Notwithstanding these recommendations, the attitudes which
facilitated the preparation of the lists have persisted into our
days and have generated at the same time the repressive acts on
the part of the state as a result of which some of the youngest
supporters of independence have lost their life. It has not been
until this case had been filed, that the State, for the first time,

28. Id. at 693-94.
29. Id. at 696-97.
30. Id. at 702.
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has accepted the unconstitutionality of the practice and has
established a mechanism to deal with the situation. 1
In another related appeal in 1992, one that also dealt with
governmental objections to the procedure established by the court to
provide free access to the files of those affected by the practice, Judge
Jaime Fuster Berlinger, a former Commonwealth Resident Commissioner in Congress in his first year as an associate Judge, offered his
own advice as to what the Commonwealth government should do:
One of the measures that the Governor and the Legislative
Assembly should consider would be an official public apology
on the part of the State, offered with great lucidity and solemnity; one with profound educational content, which both, islandwide and also in front of the eyes of the world, will accept the
wrong done, that would help us increase our collective understanding regarding the rights of minorities and that would open
the way to reconciliation with those whose rights had been
trampled. 2
The tone, as well as the substance, of Judge Fuster's recommendations did not go unheeded. Eventually, a number of cases were
presented at the district court level. In a partial judgment issued on
May 1999, the Court of First Instance found the government of the
Commonwealth responsible for the practices.33 On December 14,
1999, Governor Pedro Rossell6 sent an executive order that extended
an offer of compensation to the victims. 34 The wording of the executive order follows the broad contours of the language in Judge Fuster's
opinion.
The executive order, in its dispositive first and second paragraphs, "publicly" recognizes the injustice caused by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's preparation and pursuance of files and dossiers
of citizens based exclusively on ideological considerations.35 It also

31. Id.
32. Noriega-Rodriguez v. Herndndez Col6n, 1992 WL 755596 at *23-25.
33. See Boletin Administrativo Num. Oe-1999-62, Orden Ejecutiva Del Gobernador De
Puerto Rico Para Reconocer Pfiblicamente La Injusticia Ocasionada Por La Confecci6n Y
Mantenimiento Por El Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico De Expedientes Y Carpetas De
Ciudadanos Unica Y Exclusivamente Pot Razones Ideologicas; Presentar A Los Ciudadanos
Afectados Y A Todos Sus Familiares Una Solemne Y Sincera Disculpa Del Gobierno De Puerto
Rico Por La Confeccion Y Mantenimiento De Estos Expedientes Y Carpetas; Y Asignar
Recursos Del Fondo Presupuestario A Fin De Promover La Compensacion A Los Ciudadanos
Afectados Por La Descrita Practica.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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"presents to the affected citizens and their families a sincere and
solemn apology" for this practice. 6
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The judges' opinions in Noriega v. Herndndez Col6n, as well as
the related cases that followed, show that the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico was aware that there was much more than a miscarriage of justice
in the issues involved. Violations of complex principles regarding
human dignity, self-esteem, and collective self-identity were directly
involved. The controversy concerned the foundations by which the
Puerto Rican social fabric could structure an enduring minimal political consensus that could ensure democratic governance in Puerto
Rico. Once the Commonwealth government admitted to engaging in
the practices, the domestic appellate courts felt liberated from the
potential political dissonances and fall-out that may have befallen
them as they entered into the uncertain world of politics. There were
still, of course, some angles that were not considered.
Critics still question what role, if any, the federal government
played in encouraging or supporting those policies for more than 50
years.37 Questions still remain regarding the extent to which some of
the persecuted groups participated in a conspiracy with foreign
countries, thus creating a credible threat to United States security.
With regard to both questions, the solutions found may have been, in
one case, overinclusive and, in another, underinclusive.
The supreme court, however, realized that it had to look beyond
the past and into the future. It is at this stage where we understand
that therapeutic jurisprudence analysis could be useful to us in following the court's position. The court had to provide a therapeutic
encounter that would offer a new opportunity for a more inclusive
Puerto Rican society. The court was not ready to leave that task in the
hands of the state, which was seen by many as eminently responsible
for what had happened.3 8 Other than the courts, there was no one to
36. Id.
37. Recently, Senator Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana, a former professor of Public International Law at Northeastern University, filed a resolution at the local legislature that may open
the door to such an inquiry in the future. In a House Committee Hearing, Louis Freeh, FBI
Director, admitted that the FBI had, in fact, persecuted supporters of independence in the 1970s.
See Mario Santana, Nuevo para Romero el Carpeteo del FBI, EL NUEVO DiA, March 21, 2000, at
25.
38. In Noriega-Rodriguez v. Hernindez Col6n, Judge Ortiz, quoting Silva v. HerndndezAgosto says:
Our structures of government do not tolerate that the political branches of government become arbiters of their own actions.
Noriega-Rodriguez,130 P.R. Dec. at 971.
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provide a process, a framework for a solution, and the will to supervise
that process. The court also took into its hands the task of making
sure that a new legal process would restore social and psychological
sanity in those who had been brutally affected by decades of political
persecution. This is the context in which some of the words used by
the judges, as well as the language of executive order, must be seen.
Judge Foster talks about "reconciliation," "apology," and "acceptance." The executive order uses the terms "solemn and sincere
apology."
The "subversive lists" cases requested from the courts in their
appellate role a language that took them beyond the role of "listeners,"
"translators," and "facilitators," which Professor Des Rosiers identified in the Canadian Supreme Court context. This time, the state
itself, after more than 50 years, was ready to concede the wrong
inflicted. Yet, the avenues for correction, which the state offered, were
not enough considering the nature and extent of the damage done.
The executive branch on its own could not insist on keeping control of
the process. The state could not insist on hiding the identities of the
informers. Even then, the state wrestled with the courts, moving
slowly, until the court, in another related decision, finally declared
that the informers would not be found responsible for any wrongdoing. 9 Yet, the dossiers were still distributed to the claimants with
the names of the informers included in them, which was, in effect, a
moral victory for the plaintiffs. It was after that decision that the
Governor approved the executive order.
As the reader may realize, in this situation, contrary to the Canadian case, neither healing nor solace of the victims was obtained just
by the fact that the courts provided attentive ears as listeners, nor by
the fact that the courts played the role of "translator" between two
communities that did not understand each other well enough, although the language used by the court could have had that effect. Nor
was the role of mediator at this stage of great value either. This time,
there was a need to move a step further, a need for a "scolding" as well
as a restorative approach-a clear, transparent message by the judicial
branch.
From now on, perpetrators of this conduct should know that
what they did was unacceptable in terms of democratic governance
and there will be no tolerance for it in the future. A small slap on the
wrist is not enough anymore. As with many other examples of immature conduct, direct governmental accountability for the human rights
violations involved may be necessary-a public, "transparent"
39. Medina-Morales v. Cruz-Manzano, 96 J.T.S. 126.
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accountability, with direct financial impact on the principal violator,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
The court in this case had to play an active role, which no other
governmental institution, local or federal, was able or ready to playthe role of a balanced facilitator ready to let the full weight of responsibility fall upon those constitutionally responsible, condemning the acts
and protecting and publicly restoring the human dignity of those
affected by it. The court had to act with both firmness and love.
Societal therapy would claim no less. Consciously or not, a therapeutic approach may have provided the rationale.

